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LEONARD L. RiSKiN*
A mediator helps disputants toward resolving their disagreement. Unlike
a judge or arbitrator, however, the mediator lacks authority to impose a
decision on the parties; he can only facilitate the processI Mediation has been
and remains the dominant method of processing disputes in some quarters of
the world! In parts of the Orient litigation is seen as a shameful last resort,
the use of which signifies embarrassing failure to settle the matter amicably.
Though it is unclear to what extent philosophy influences practice, the con-
nection between the prominence of mediation and a Confucian heritage has
been noted repeatedly by scholars . In the Confucian view,
[a] lawsuit symbolized disruption of the natural harmony that was thought to exist
in human affairs. Law was backed by coercion, and therefore tainted in the eyes of
Confucianists. Their view was that the optimum resolution of most disputes was to
be achieved not by the exercise of sovereign force but by moral persuasion.
Moreover, litigation led to litigiousness and to shameless concern for one's own
interest to the detriment of the interests of society.
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1. P. GULLIVER, DISPUTES AND NEGOTIATIONS: A CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 209 (1979). See
Eckoff, The Mediator, the Judge and the Administrator in Conflict-Resolution, 10 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 148,
158-61 (1967). See text accompanying note 54 infra, for a discussion of the variety of methods used by mediators.
2. See I D. HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW 1-3 (1965); Cohen, Chinese Mediation on
the Eve of Modernization, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1966); Hahm, The Decision Frocess in Korea in
COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 19, 19-20 (G. Schubert & D. Danielski eds. 1969); Lubman, Mao and
Mediation: Politics and Dispute Resolution in Communist China, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1284, 1285-86 (1967);
Marasinghe, The Use of Conciliation for Dispute Settlement: The Sri Lanka Experience, 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
389, 393-400 (1980).
3. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1206-07.
4. Id. at 1207. See also Northrop, The Mediational Approval Theory in American Legal Realism, 44 VA.
L. REV. 347, 349 (1958).
In China up to the end of the 19th century, mediation was helped along by an enormously corrupt court
system that the Emperors had no desire to improve. In the words of the K'ang-hsi Emperor (1662-1722);
[L]awsuits would tend to increase to a frightful amount, if people were notafraid of the tribunals, and if
they felt confident of always finding in them ready and perfect justice. As man is apt to delude himself
concerning his own interests, contests would then be interminable, and half of the Empire would not
suffice to settle the lawsuits of the other half. I desire, therefore, that those who have recourse to the
tribunals should be treated without any pity, and in such a manner that they shall be disgusted with
law, and tremble to appear before a magistrate.
T. JERNIGAN, CHINA IN LAW AND COMMERCE 191 (1905).
For a contemporary view of mediation in China, which is carried out through local committees that
"educate" the disputants toward compliance with the needs of socialist society, see Slaybod, The Strange
World of China's Laityers, BARRISTER. Winter 1980, at 10.
5. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1207.
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This idea-that the natural and desirable condition is harmony-con-
trasts sharply with the predominant Western perspectives which focus on
freedom as an absence of restraint and on autonomy and individual liberty as
the highest goal.6 These Western notions, crystallized in the adversary
system, pervade the American legal process and the lives of most of its
citizens, including its lawyers. In recent years, though, mediation as a means
of dispute processing has sent vines through the adversarial fence.7 They
differ somewhat in purpose, orientation, and direction, but share a rapid
growth rate. The development of mediation promises much that is good for
American society and carries significant dangers as well.
This Article examines how we can make the most of mediation's promise
while protecting against its dangers. Part I describes the status of mediation in
this country. It argues that in order for our society to reap the benefits of
mediation while containing its risks, many lawyers must come to understand
mediation and a significant number must develop an ability and willingness to
mediate a variety of matters that are currently pushed through the adversary
mill. In Part II, I explain the forces working against proper involvement of
lawyers in mediation and conclude that mediation education for lawyers and
law students is essential to fostering such involvement. Part III describes
forces pressing toward suitable involvement of lawyers in mediation. The
Article concludes, in Part IV, somewhat speculatively, with some possible
side effects of the growth of mediation education for lawyers in this country.
I. MEDIATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Ten years ago, most American lawyers would have associated mediation s
with international 9 or labor relations disputes,'0 and probably confused it with
6. See May, Adversarialism in America, CENTER MAGAZINE, Jan.-Feb. 1981, at 47, 48. See also D.
YANKELOVICH, NEW RULES, SEARCHING FOR SELF-FULFILLMENT IN A WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN
xviii (1980).
7. See text accompanying notes 16-41 infra.
8. In 1 D. HENDERSON, CONCILIATION AND JAPANESE LAW (1965), mediation is split into three cate-
gories: "Prestate or prelegal," which takes place between independent entities, such as nations, that are not
mutually bound by a legal system; "didactic or proto-legal," in which the parties are educated or persuaded to
do what the community requires of them (e.g., Tokugawa Japan, traditional and current China); and "volun-
tary," in which there is a practicable judicial option (e.g., Japan since 1951 and Norway). Id. at 4-5.
Sometimes conciliation is distinguished from mediation, with conciliation comprehending a go-between
function designed to get or keep the parties talking, and mediation as a more active process on the part of the
third party. D. MCGILLIS & J. MULLEN, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS, AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL
MODELS 10-11 (1977) [hereinafter cited as MCGILLIS & MULLEN]. No consistent usage has evolved, however.
"Conciliation" in I D. HENDERSON, supra, includes what McGillis and Mullen would call "mediation." Other
commentators use the terms interchangeably. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 95, 129 (1974); Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70
F.R.D. i11, 115 n.14 (1976).
The kinds of "dispute processing" discussed in this Article include heavy third-party involvement. Accord-
ingly, and because I find the term more inclusive, I will normally use "mediation."
9. See F. EDMEAD, ANALYSIS AND PREDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION (1971); R. FISHER,
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION: A WORKING GUIDE (1978).
10. Government-provided mediation has long been an important method of resolving difficult labor-man-
agement disputes. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) has the duty "to assist parties to
labor disputes in industries affecting commerce to settle such disputes through conciliation and mediation." 29
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arbitration." But in the last decade, mediation programs have proliferated at a
breathtaking rate in this country. 2 Most of these efforts have been directed at
what the American Bar Association has called "minor disputes" 13-those
involving "relatively small amounts of money or relatively pedestrian
issues" "-and were designed to provide dispute processing services for
cases that the standard adversary system cannot handle. 5 Increasingly, how-
ever, mediation is finding application in disputes that normally are processed
through the adversary system.
A. "Minor" Disputes
A large number of cities have neighborhood justice centers,' 6 in which
volunteers '7 from the community mediate (or arbitrate) interpersonal, neigh-
borhood, domestic, consumer, landlord-tenant, or minor criminal disputes.
Referrals come largely from prosecutors, police, or courts, 8 though some
neighborhood justice centers have a community orientation and rely more
U.S.C. § 173(a) (1976). And it "may proffer its services ... whenever... such dispute threatens to cause a
substantial interruption of commerce .. ." Id. § 173(b). These services normally are used when there is a
deadlock in collective bargaining. See generally W. SIMKIN, MEDIATION AND THE DYNAMICS OF COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING 199-231 (1971). The FMCS may provide its services for grievance disputes also, but "only
as a last resort and in exceptional cases." 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1976). Parties are obligated to "participate fully
and promptly" in the sessions called by the FMCS. Id. § 174(a)(3). State and local agencies also are available in
many parts of the country.
In public-sector labor-management disputes, mediation also is used heavily and provided by state, local, or
federal agencies or private individuals. See W. SIMKIN, supra, at 331-54. In addition, many collective-bargain-
ing agreements establish mediation as a means of processing grievances.
11. The confusion is persistent in conversations with lawyers and in the lay press. One reason is that both
arbitration and mediation are seen as alternatives to processing disputes through the judicial system. Another is
that mediation is wholly foreign to most lawyers' orientations. See text accompanying notes 90-118 infra.
12. See generally, Smith, A Warmer Way of Disputing: Mediation and Conciliation, 26 Am. J. COMP. L.
205 (Supp. 1978).
13. The American Bar Association sponsored a national conference on Minor Disputes Resolution in 1977.
See ABA, REPORT ON THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MINOR DISPUTES RESOLUTION (1977). The ABA
subsequently established a Special Committee on the Resolution of Minor Disputes.
14. Id. at 1. Those involved in the ABA efforts at "minor" disputes resolution have long been displeased
with the major-minor dichotomy, id., and the ABA recently changed the name of its Special Committee on the
Resolution of Minor Disputes to Special Committee on Alternative Means of Dispute Resolution. I employ the
distinction because I suspect some members of the bar may oppose the spread of mediation to major disputes.
See text accompanying notes 90-131 infra.
15. These may be viewed as parts of a broader movement to deal with weaknesses in the standard
adversary system. See generally ABA, REPORT ON THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MINOR
DISPUTES RESOLUTION; Cratsley, Community Courts: Offering Alternative Dispute Resolution Within the
Judicial System, 3 VT. L. REV. 1 (1978); Gest, Settling Out of Court: Shortcut to Justice, U.S. NEWS & W.
REP., June 15, 1981, at 61; Granelli, Got A Spat? Go Rent A Judge, Nat'l L.J., June 8, 1981 at I, col. 4; Granelli,
Other Non-courts of First Resort, id. at 31, col. 1; Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 905 (1979).
The Dispute Resolution Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-190, 94 Stat. 17 (1980), authorizes financial assistance
for fair and fast methods of minor dispute resolution and establishes a dispute resolution research center. No
funds have been appropriated, however.
16. See ABA, DISPUTE RESOLUTION DIRECTORY (1981). These were patterned after experimental pro-
jects established by the U.S. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in 1977. R. COOK, J. ROEHL, & D.
SHEPPARD, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS FIELD TEST 5-7 (1980) [hereinafter FIELD TEST]. For a
description of the precursors of the Neighborhood Justice Centers, see MCGILLIS & MULLEN, supra note 8, at
25-30.
17. Often a small payment is provided. Mediators in the Houston Neighborhood Justice project are paid
$10.00 for an evening of mediation, which frequently lasts four hours.
18. FIELD TEST, supra note 16, at 24-29.
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heavily on cases brought in by the disputants themselves.' 9 These programs
have delivered speedy processing with a high level of satisfaction among the
disputants. 20
Additional efforts have been limited to cases connected with a given
court 2 1 or prosecutor's office that sponsored the program.2 Still others have
sought a "community-base" with a hope of dealing with broader problems
23
and sometimes using community leaders as mediators. 24 For a long time,
various local ethnic groups have used mediation to deal with all manner of
disputes among members,2 and social pressure often assures compliance?6
Mediation, sometimes combined with arbitration, also has been used
lately in special programs established by individual businesses or by trade
associations to handle consumer complaints.27 Prisons, schools, and other
institutions have joined the movement.2 8
B. "Major" Disputes
New efforts at using mediation for dealing with "major" disputes of two
principal types also have developed. The first includes conflicts, such as
racial or environmental disputes, that concern many persons or interest
groups in one locality. 29 The second is domestic relations-primarily divorce
and child custody. Because family mediation is developing more rapidly, and
because it involves lawyers heavily, it will receive substantial attention in this
Article.
Some family mediation is governed by statute. A recent California law,
for instance, provides for "mandatory mediation" of child custody issues in
divorce cases before adversary processing 0 But the bulk of divorce
mediation, and the portion that is significant for purposes of this Article, is
voluntary for both parties. The services are provided through conciliation
19. The experimental Venice/Mar Vista Neighborhood Justice Center project is an example. Id. at 37.
20. Id. at 87-9 1. But cf. Hofrichter, Justice Centers Raise Basic Questions, 2 NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL
SERVICES 168, 169-70 (1977) (highlighting the potential of centers for discouraging less powerful persons from
attacking the root causes of their social and legal problems).
21. See Greason, Humanists as Mediators' An Experiment in the Courts of Maine, 66 A.B.A. J. 576 (1980);
Snyder, Crime and Community Mediation-The Boston Experience: A Preliminary Report on the Dorchester
Urban Court Program, 1978 WIS. L. REV. 737.
22. See FIELD TEST, supra note 16, at 5.
23. Id. at 5; Rifkin, d'Errico and Katsh. Legal Studies and Mediation, 32 NEW DIRECTiONS FOR HIGHER
EDUC. 49 (1980).
24. Wahrhaftig, A Time to Question Direction, in PEOPLES' LAW REVIEW 212, 213-14 (R. Warner ed.
1980) (describing the Community Association for Mediation in Pittsburgh).
25. MCGILLIS & MULLEN, supra note 8, at 13-14; Doo, Dispute Settlement in Chinese-American
Communities, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 627 (1973).
26. MCGILLIS & MULLEN, supra note 8, at 14.
27. Id. at 12-13.
28. Id. at 14-15.
29. See Dibrell, Mediation in Civil Rights Issues, the Port Arthur Experience, THE POLICE CHIEF, Nov.
1976, at 80; Goldbeck, Mediation: An Instrument of Citizen Involvement, 30 ARB. J. 241 (1975); Straus,
Mediating Environmental Disputes, 33 ARB. J. 5 (1978).
For an account of the work of a mediator for the Community Relations Service of the U.S. Department of
Justice, see Dibrell, supra.
30. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1980). In addition, the Family Conciliation Court has jurisdiction
over certain kinds of domestics disputes. Id. § 1760 (West Supp. 1981).
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courts3, or organizations or by individuals, working alone or in teams, who may
have professional training or credentials in disciplines such as psychotherapy
or law.32 Preliminary reports suggest that these efforts often have been very
successful in saving the disputants time and money,33 providing a humane
atmosphere, and producing terms that are more congruent with the parties'
lives than those found in court decrees, 34 and which, therefore, are much
more likely to be obeyed.35
Mediation is especially useful in divorce cases because the strong emo-
tional forces at work may call for more delicately wrought measures than
could be provided in a court-imposed solution. But it is not for every divorcing
couple. They must have a strong commitment and the emotional and intel-
lectual abilities to cooperate, notwithstanding their difficulties, in dividing up
property and developing a framework for governing their future relation-
ship.36 Each partner should be more interested in honoring the other's unique
needs than hurting him. And they should be about equally powerful.
Mediation can help in other contexts in which the parties have a complex,
interdependent relationship, 37 relative equality of bargaining power,3 8 and
strong incentives to work out their own relationship with minimal reliance
upon others. These characteristics are often present in persons who seek
lawyers' help in creating, operating, or dissolving organizations, contracts, or
other relationships. 39 And when such characteristics are weak, they can be
potentiated by an urge to save time and money 4° and avoid the possible
nastiness and aggravating effects of adversary processing.4' Thus, many
31. H. IRVING, DIVORCE MEDIATION 46-49 (1980).
32. See 0. COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETrLEMENT 75 (1978); Galante, The
One-Lawyer Divorce, Nat'l Law J., Jan 25, 1982, at 1, col. 1; Haynes, Divorce Mediator: A New Role, 23 SOC.
WORK 5 (1978).
33. Bahr, Mediation is the Answer, FAM. L. ADVOCATE, Spring 1981, at 32.
34. Id.
35. Coogler, Weber and McKenry, Divorce Mediation: A Means of Facilitating Divorce and Adjustment,
28 FAM. COORDINATOR 255, 258 (1979).
36. Harris, Divorce's Friendly Persuaders, MONEY, April 1980, at 85. See generally Kressel, Jaffee,
Tuchman, Watson and Deutsch, A Typology of Divorcing Couples: Implications for Mediation and the Divorce
Process, 19 FAM. PROCESS 101 (1980).
37. See Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 310 (1971). For a critical
assessment of the assumption that disputants with "multiplex" ties will try to compromise their differences,
because their goal will be maintenance of their relationship rather than winning, see Starr and Ygvesson,
Scarcity and Disputing: Zeroing-in on Compromise Decisions, 2 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 553 (1975).
38. See Fuller, supra note 37, at 310, 314; Felstiner, Influences of Social Organization on Dispute Proces-
sing, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 63, 81 (1974).
39. See Fuller, supra note 37, at 309-12.
40. See The Highest Legal Fees, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 24, 1981, at 71. Consumer advocate Ralph Nader
recently advised large corporations that were concerned with cutting legal fees to increase their use of mediation
and out-of-court settlements as well as to beef up the responsibilities of in-house counsel. Fat Fees, TIME, July
27, 1981, at 68.
41. For a discussion of the nastiness and aggravating effects of the judicial adversary process, see
M. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 62-63 (1978).
Mediation could have some use even if the parties are disputing mainly over an amount of money to be paid
in damages for a personal injury claim arising out of an accident between strangers. But cf. Fuller, supra note 37,
at 314 ("[M]ediation has scarcely any role to play in human relationships fluidly organized on... the market
principle."). To the extent that the alleged malfeasor's insurance carrier is the real party, the negotiation process
might well be expedited through mediation. In addition, the injured person's antagonism toward the alleged
malfeasor is not fully discharged by the receipt of money from the insurance carrier. Mediation would give the
Darties a chance to rectify their relationship-which both may need.
1982]
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persons who now use an adversarial lawyer to handle their disputes could
benefit enormously if they also could take advantage of appropriate mediation
services. Savings to society in the form of reduced court costs would follow as
well.
C. Mediation and the Law
Mediation offers some clear advantages over adversary processing: it is
cheaper, faster, and potentially more hospitable to unique solutions that take
more fully into account nonmaterial interests of the disputants. 42 It can edu-
cate the parties about each other's needs and those of their community
43
Thus, it can help them learn to work together and to see that through coop-
eration both can make positive gains. 44 One reason for these advantages is
that mediation is less hemmed-in by rules of procedure or substantive law and
certain assumptions that dominate the adversary process. There are, of
course, assumptions that affect the procedure and results achieved in media-
tions-assumptions about mutuality, cooperation, and fairness,4 and general
principles that ought to govern; in some systems, rules that approximate
applicable law even serve as starting points. 46 But in mediation-as distin-
guished from adjudication and, usually, arbitration-the ultimate authority
resides with the disputants. The conflict is seen as unique and therefore less
subject to solution by application of some general principle. 47 The case is
neither to be governed by a precedent nor to set one.48 Thus, all sorts of facts,
needs, and interests that would be excluded from consideration in an adver-
sary, rule-oriented proceeding could become relevant in a mediation. Indeed,
whatever a party deems relevant is relevant.4 9 In a divorce mediation, for
instance, a spouse's continuing need for emotional support could become
important, as could the other party's willingness and ability to give it. In most
mediations, the emphasis is not on determining rights or interests, or who is
right and who is wrong, or who wins and who loses because of which rule;
these would control the typical adjudicatory proceeding. The focus, instead,
is upon establishing a degree of harmony through a resolution that will work
for these disputants. 5
A danger inheres in this alegal character: individuals who are not aware
of their legal position are not encouraged by the process to develop a rights-
42. See J. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION 10-Il (1981); Northrop, supra note 4, at 350-51.
43. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1224-25; Goldbeck, supra note 29, at 245-46.
44. J. HAYNES, supra note 42, at 5.
Of course, if only money or property is at stake, it may not be possible for both to gain from mediation
except to the extent that litigation costs are avoided. That is why mediation most often is employed if parties
have complex relationships. See note 40 supra.
45. See generally, Friedman, Mediation: Reducing Dependence on Lawyers and Courts to Achieve Justice,
in PEOPLES' LAW REVIEW 42 passim (R. Warner ed. 1981).
46. See 0. COOGLER, supra note 32, at 13-22; note 59 infra.
47. See Marasinghe, supra note 2, at 400-03; Northrop, supra note 4, at 356.
48. See Northrop, supra note 4, at 353.
49. See Marasinghe, supra note 2, at 395-96, 401.
50. See Fuller, supra note 37, at 326; Marasinghe, supra note 2, at 403.
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consciousness or to establish legal rights. 5' Thus, the risk of dominance by the
stronger or more knowledgeable party is great.52 Accordingly, for society to
maximize the benefits of mediation while controlling its dangers, it must
carefully adjust the role of lawyers in the mediation process.
Though mediation agreements typically neither set nor follow legal
precedent, they often have important legal consequences. Frequently, the
mere making of an agreement defers legal action by one of the disputants or
the government. The agreement itself may establish or avoid legally enforce-
able rights. To reduce the danger that less powerful persons unwittingly will
give up legal rights that would be important to them, they must be afforded a
way of knowing about the nature of the adversary process and the result it
would likely produce. But the very presentation of the rules that would prob-
ably govern a decision if the matter were litigated may impel parties toward
adopting the predicted results, rather than regarding the law as simply one
factor-to be blended with a variety of economic, personal, and social con-
siderations-in reaching a decision. At the same time, if such information is
not readily available to them, they are not necessarily free from influence by
the law; they may be basing their decisions to mediate and their judgments
during mediation upon inaccurate assumptions about what result would fol-
low from adversary processing. 3
D. The Role of the Mediator
Nearly all mediators seek to help the disputants achieve an agreement.
Most have educational objectives as well, especially where the parties will
have a continuing relationship. There are, however, enormous differences in
procedures and in roles that mediators adopt. Some will act merely as go-
betweens, keeping open lines of communication. They may or may not give
their own suggestions when the parties have deadlocked. Some mediators will
separate the parties physically; others will insist on keeping them together.
Some mediators will urge that the parties propose solutions; others will make
51. See I D. HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 9-10; Cohen, supra note 2, at 1207-08, 1215; Marasinghe, supra
note 2, at 407; Ohta and Hozumi, Compromise In The Course of Litigation, 6 LAW IN JAPAN 97, 109 (1973);
Hahm, The Decision Process In Korea, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 19-21 (G. Schubert & D.
Danielski eds. 1969).
52. This is a special danger when mediation is being used to support the established order. See Cohen,
supra note 2, at 1208; Hofrichter, supra note 20, at 169-70.
Obviously, the judicial process, as it functions in this country, is vulnerable to the same criticism. Howard
Zinn gives an extreme view:
The "rule of law" in modem society is no less authoritarian than the rule of men in pre-modern
society; it enforces the maldistribution of wealth and power as of old, but it does this in such compli-
cated and indirect ways as to leave the observer bewildered.... In slavery, the feudal order, the
colonial system, deception and patronization are the minor modes of control; force is the major one. In
the modem world of liberal capitalism (and also, we should note, of state socialism), force is held in
reserve while . . . "a multitude of moral teachers, counselors, and bewilderers separate the exploited
from those in power." In this multitude, the books of law are among the most formidable bewilderers.
Zinn, The Conspiracy of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW 18-19 (R. Wolff ed. 1971).
53. I am aware of the dangers of inaccurate predictions by lawyers.
19821
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
their own proposals and try to persuade the parties to accept them and may
even apply economic, social, or moral pressure to achieve a "voluntary"
agreement. 5
4
One of the principal functions of the mediator is managing the com-
munications process. He must intervene carefully at the correct moments.
Accordingly, he must understand interpersonal relations and negotiations.55
He must be able to listen well and perceive the underlying emotional, psycho-
logical, and value orientations that may hold the keys to resolving more
quantifiable issues. 56 And he must arrange for these to be honored in the
mediation process, the agreement, and the resulting relationship. 57 A like
sensitivity is essential for good lawyering as well, but it occupies a more
prominent place on the list of skills required of a mediator.
E. The Role of the Lawyer in Mediation
Nearly all mediation efforts distinguish between the functions of the
lawyer and those of the mediator, even where the mediator is a lawyer. In the
Houston Neighborhood Justice Center project, for instance, the involvement
of lawyers is not encouraged. People wishing or needing legal advice are
referred to lawyers who are not connected with the Center. Though about one
out of seven of the mediators, all of whom have completed a forty hour train-
ing program, is a lawyer, each is enjoined not to give legal advice, and they
generally do not let disputants know that they are lawyers. Lawyers are not to
think or act like lawyers when they are mediating. All mediators, lawyers or
not, draw up resulting agreements, which the parties sign. The emphasis is on
simple language, not precise drafting.
Not infrequently, a mediation will be concerned with one part, say harass-
ment, of a larger problem, such as divorce, for which the parties have legal
representation. In these and other cases in which the parties have counsel, the
lawyers are allowed but not encouraged to attend the mediation sessions.
In family mediation, on the other hand, the involvement of a lawyer is
recognized as essential and has developed in several different ways. The
lawyer may be an "impartial" advisor to both parties, a legal advisor to one
54. Cohen, supra note 2, at 1201. See P. GULLIVER, supra note 1, at 219-28; see also text accompanying
note 26 supra.
Gulliver cautions against the assumption that the mediator is neutral. In some systems it is permissible for
the mediator to be partial to one side. Sometimes the mediator will have the interests of a dominant class or
individual or of the community at heart. Moreover, the mediator may gain prestige by securing an agreement. P.
GULLIVER, supra note 1, at 213-16.
55. P. GULLIVER, supra note 1, at 219-20.
56. See Steinberg, Towards an Interdisciplinary Commitment: A Divorce Lawyer Proposes Attorney-
Therapist Marriages or, at the Least, an Affair, J. MARITAL & FAM. THERAPY, July 1980, at 259, 264. Some
have taken the view that mediation is similar to group psychotherapy and that, accordingly, a mediator needs
the skills of a group therapist. Knowles, Mediation and the Psychology of Small Groups, 9 LAB. L.Jo 780,
782-83 (1958); cf. Smith, supra note 12, at 208 (mediation provides a form of therapy or catharsis).
57. See Pickrell and Bendheim, Family Disputes Mediation-A New Service for Lawyers and Their Clients
BARRISTER, Winter 1980, at 27-28.
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party, or a member of an interdisciplinary team. In addition, he may function
explicitly as a mediator.
In Structured Mediation in Divorce Settlement-a system conceived by
lawyer 0. J. Coogler 58 and propagated through training programs conducted
by the Family Mediation Association-a set of rules, patterned after the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, is used as a starting point in deciding
issues of property division, alimony, and child support and custody.59 An
advisory attorney is drawn from a panel to answer legal questions and prepare
documents.6 Under the original plan, lawyers were not to work as mediators
since they were "not as well equipped [to handle problems involving inter-
personal conflict], because of their lack of training in behavioral sciences, as
well as ethical restrictions under which they must practice."-6' In fact, Family
Mediation Association training now is available to lawyers, but the lawyer
and mediator functions remain distinct. 62
In other settings, each member of the couple in divorce mediation will
have his or her own lawyer before or during the mediation;63 some mediators
in these situations prefer to draft the agreement and then urge each party to
secure independent legal review.64 Finally, some lawyers work as a team with
a psychotherapist who functions as a mediator.65
A lawyer may function explicitly as a divorce mediator, also. He may do
so by representing one of the spouses, leaving the other unrepresented; both
of the spouses; or neither of the spouses.
Each of these models has strengths and weaknesses.
Parties who have independent counsel can benefit from an adversarial
look at their position. A prediction of the likely results of adversary proces-
sing is necessary for an informed, fully voluntary decision about a mediated
solution. Sometimes lawyers also aid the mediation process by urging their
clients to accept a reasonable compromise. There is a concomitant likelihood,
however, that a lawyer's advice will work to undermine a mediation. Of course,
this occasionally will be in the client's best interest. But some lawyers-for a
58. 0. COOGLER, supra note 32, at 13-22.
59. Id. Although Coogler states that clients should have "the greatest autonomy in reaching settlement,"
id. at 26, the system contemplates adherence to norms not necessarily created by, nor attuned to, the interests of
the parties. For instance, he indicates that the mediator should refuse to concur in an agreement "which is
manifestly not in keeping with the ethical and legal responsibilities of the parties-if, for example, a mother
agrees to assume full responsibility for the support of the children despite the father's ability to contribute to
their support." Id. at 26-27.
60. Id. at 25-26.
61. Id. at 85.
62. Training Programs, FAM. MEDIATOR, Nov. 1981, at 4.
63. See, e.g., Pickrell and Bendheim, supra note 57, at 28.
64. Haynes, supra note 32, at 84.
65. See Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce Mediation, 7 Fain. L. Rep. (BNA)
4001, 4005, 4010 n.51 (1981).
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variety of reasons discussed below6 -may tend to deliver advice in a way that
exaggerates the importance of the adversary perspective and the accuracy of
their predictions. When this occurs, the client may be drawn away inappro-
priately from a mediated resolution. But the risk of inappropriate disruption by
outside lawyers also is directly related to the level of the parties' commitment
to nonadversarial processing. A person who truly wanted to resolve his prob-
lem in a nonadversarial, personal fashion-if he is satisfied with the results of
mediation-would not be inclined to give high value to the possible advantages
proferred by the adversary lawyer.
One way to lessen the likelihood of a lawyer's undermining a mediation is
to employ an impartial attorney to advise both parties, but this raises a number
of worries. There are, as examples, mild possibilities of charges of aiding in the
unauthorized practice of law (a violation of DR 3-101(A)) or practicing law in
association with or otherwise sharing fees with a layman (a violation of DR
3-102(A)).67 The most substantial concern, however, is the enormous difficulty
of giving impartial or neutral legal advice if the parties have conflicting inter-
ests. This raises the spectre of breaching the requirement of Canon 5 that a
lawyer exercise independent professional judgment on behalf of a client. A
recent opinion imposed, inter alia, the conditions that "the issues not be of
such complexity that the parties cannot prudently reach resolution of the
controversy without the advice of separate and independent legal cousel," and
that the lawyer advise the parties of the limitations and risks of his role and of
the advantages of independent legal counsel, obtain their informed consent,
give legal advice only in the presence of both, and refrain from representing
either in a subsequent proceeding concerning divorce.6 If one lawyer advises
the couple, each partner is deprived of the benefit of an adversarial look at his
or her situation.
The interdisciplinary approach seems to offer enormous promise. It can
attend at once to legal, emotional, value, and relational needs. Each of the
professionals can learn from the other and broaden his own view of the
situation. The problems, though, seem just as great as those presented to the
lawyer-mediator alone. Here again, the Code of Professional Responsibility
may present obstacles: the Canon 5 injuction to exercise independent profes-
sional judgment; the Canon 3 mandate to assist in preventing the unauthorized
practice of law; and the DR 3-102(A) prohibition of practicing law or sharing
fees with a layman.69 But practical difficulties seem even weightier. Anyone
who has tried it knows that interdisciplinary work is difficult. Lawyers and
therapists look at the world differently. In addition, the team approach presents
66. See text accompanying notes 90-131 infra.
67. Maryland State Bar Assoc., Opinions, No. 80-55A (Aug. 20, 1980) at 2; Silberman, supra note 65, at
4007-08; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-101(A) & 3-102(A).
68. New York City Bar Assoc., Opinions, No. 80-23 in 7 Fain. L. Rep. [BNA] 3097, 3099-100 (1981).
69. Silberman, supra note 65, at 4006. For a discussion of several bar association ethics opinions on this




problems of control, responsibility, and jurisdiction that will severely tax the
talents and personalities of those who try it. The lawyer-therapist/mediator
team can work very well, but only rarely will an adequate match-up of profes-
sionals occur.
When a lawyer functions explicitly as a mediator while representing both
of the parties, or just one of the parties while leaving the other unrepresented,
the principal professional responsibility concern is again the Canon 5 re-
quirement that a lawyer exercise independent professional judgment on behalf
of a client. 70 Bar associations have traditionally prohibited dual representation
in matrimonial cases7' but have recently shown some signs of liberalization.
The Ohio state bar ethics committee recently permitted a lawyer to draft a
separation agreement for a couple so long as he was representing one of the
parties and the other was protected by giving a knowing consent. 2 The Arizona
committee also has permitted dual representation,73 as has a California
appellate court in limited circumstances, including full disclosure of risks.74
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 5-20, permits
a lawyer to mediate in a matter that involves "present or former clients ... if
he first discloses such.., relationships.., and [does not] thereafter repre-
sent in the dispute any of the parties involved. ' ,75 The Wisconsin bar ethics
committee has ruled that a lawyer who educated the parties about their legal
rights and responsibilities, mediated disputes during the negotiations, drafted
documents, and appeared in court would find himself beyond the protection
of EC 5-20, &ven though each party would receive independent legal review
of the agreement and the lawyer would not represent either party subse-
quently.!6 And, of course, there are significant risks of a malpractice action.!
The principal danger of dual representation is that one of the parties will
take unfair advantage of the other, knowingly or not. With this in mind, Rule
2.2 of the proposed final draft of the American Bar Association Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, which would apply where a lawyer represents both
parties, provides that:
(a) A lawyer may act as intermediary between clients if:
(1) The lawyer discloses to each client the implications of the common repre-
sentation, including the advantages and risks involved, and obtains each client's
consent to the common representation;
(2) The lawyer reasonably believes that the matter can be resolved on terms
compatible with the clients' best interests, that each client will be able to make
adequately informed decisions in the matter and that there is little risk of material
prejudice to the interest of any of the clients if the contemplated resolution is
unsuccessful; and
70. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5.
71. Silberman, supra note 65, at 4001.
72. Ohio State Bar Assoc., Opinions, No. 30 (1975).
73. Arizona State Bar Assoc., Opinions, No. 76-25 (November 25, 1976).
74. Klemm v. Superior Court of Fresno County, 75 Cal. App. 3d 893, 142 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1977).
75. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-20.
76. Wisconsin Bar Assoc., Opinions, No. E-79-2 (1980).
77. See Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237 (Mo. App. 1981).
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(3) The lawyer reasonably believes that the common representation can be
undertaken impartially and without improper effect on other responsibilities the
lawyer has to any of the clients.
(b) While acting as intermediary, the lawyer shall explain fully to each client the
decisions to be made and the considerations relevant in making them, so that each
client can make adequately informed decisions.
(c) A lawyer shall withdraw as intermediary if any of the clients so requests, if the
conditions stated in paragraph (a) cannot be met or if in the light of subsequent
events the lawyer reasonably should know that a mutually advantageous resolu-
tion cannot be achieved. Upon withdrawal, the lawyer shall not continue to rep-
resent any of the clients unless doing so is clearly compatible with the lawyer's
responsibilities to the other client or clients.
78
This model offers significant potential advantages to clients who wish to
save time and money and avoid an adversarial confrontation. Yet when assets
or interests that the parties consider significant are involved, they will usually
want the benefit of a partisan look at their case.79
The most recent development-the lawyer serving as divorce mediator
but not representing either party-has earned the qualified approval of the
Boston and Oregon bar ethics committees.80 The Oregon opinion imposed the
conditions that the attorney
1. . . . must clearly inform the parties he represents neither of them and they
both must consent to this arrangement;
2 .... may give legal advice only to both parties in the presence of each other;
3 .... may draft the proposed agreement but he must advise, and encourage, the
parties to seek independent legal counsel before execution of the agreement; and




This model seems to offer the best possibilities for the appropriate use of
law and lawyers in mediation of some matters that normally pass through the
adversary process. The attorney-mediator can attempt to provide impartial
legal information while making clear the risks to the clients in his doing so.
The outside consultations with lawyers can defend against the possibility of
bias (deliberate or not) in the lawyer-mediator's work and reduce the chances
that one party will inappropriately exercise power over the other.
Another advantage is that information about what a court would do can
be integrated into the mediation process in a way that suits the needs of the
parties. Because he is an expert on law, the lawyer-mediator can help the
parties free themselves, when appropriate, from the influence of legal norms
78. ABA COMMISSION ON EVALUATION OF PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, PROPOSED FINAL DRAFTr
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.2 (1981).
79. See text accompanying note 86 infra.
80. Boston Bar Assoc., Opinions, No. 78-1 (1978); Oregon Bar Assoc., Opinions, No. 79-46 (Proposed
1980). The Oregon opinion was subsequently tabled pending an inquiry of an attorney using a trade name in his
or her divorce mediation practice. Letter from General Counsel George Reimer to author (Jan. 14, 1982).
81. Oregon Bar Assoc., Opinions, No. 79-46 (proposed 1980).
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so that they can reach for a solution that is appropriate to them.82 In addition,
the experienced lawyer who functions as a mediator can offer a variety of
business arrangements to accomplish the objectives of the parties. These
options can become part and parcel of the decision process, and the law-
trained mediator who is present at all the sessions and thoroughly familiar
with the various needs of the parties can propose alternatives finely tuned to
such needs. Moreover, the lawyer-mediator can, better than the lay mediator,
identify a myriad of legal issues that must be addressed in the final agreement,
and press the disputants to reach decisions. He can incorporate the results in
a draft final agreement, which-because of the lawyer-mediator's skill in
identifying issues and preparing documents-would be less vulnerable to up-
ending by the outside lawyers than would one drafted by a nonlawyer.83
F. The Future of Mediation
The future of mediation in this country rests heavily upon the attitudes
and involvement of the legal profession. If society is to use mediation to its
fullest advantage-properly employing it in minor disputes and extending its
application to more major ones-and protect against the dangers of its alegal
character, lawyers must be involved, but carefully. My contention is that two
developments are required if mediation is to be used well. The first is that
many lawyers must come to understand mediation and when it can be useful.
The second is that a significant number of lawyers must begin serving explicit-
ly as mediators, in ways that also employ their legal skills.
84
Unless a lawyer is familiar with mediation and when it can be useful, he
will not be inclined to recommend it to his clients. Moreover, his orientation
may undermine a mediation process in which his client is involved. A lawyer
serving as an outside attorney to one of the parties or as an impartial advisory
attorney can help the process along only if he understands it. Lawyers and
judges play important roles in governing some minor disputes and community
mediation programs. Unless they, too, grasp mediation's potential, they may
be inclined to see these programs solely as ways of maintaining the status
quo-by processing poor people's disputes so as to relieve court congestion
82. Lon Fuller wrote that a proper function of a mediator was to help parties "to free themselves from the
encumbrance of rules and [to accept], instead, a relationship of mutual respect, trust, and understanding that
will enable them to meet shared contingencies without the aid of formal prescriptions laid down in advance."
Fuller, supra note 37, at 325-26.
83. Some of the ideas in this paragraph were derived from two days of observing divorce mediations
conducted by Gary Friedman in his Mill Valley, California, law office and discussing these with him.
Plainly, some non-lawyer mediators could become sufficiently knowledgeable about law and business
arrangements so that the agreements they produced would not be especially vulnerable to attack. One such
mediator states that none of the agreements he drafted was ever rejected by a lawyer, though they often
suggested "minor changes." Haynes, supra note 42, at 144.
Nonlawyer mediators run some risk of engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. Silberman, supra
note 65, at 4003-04.
84. For a discussion of how Sri Lankan lawyers resisted the conciliation boards that disputants were
required to use before they litigated, and from which lawyers were excluded, see Marasinghe, supra note 2, at
405-08.
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and reduce violence in the community. The danger is that this perspective
could emphasize speed over quality in mediation and might therefore exclude
the possibilities that mediation holds for helping people take charge of their
own lives instead of -expecting elites-whether government or business,
physicians or lawyers-to satisfy their needs.8 5 Each of these threats could be
softened if more lawyers understood mediation.
But an expansion of lawyers' knowledge about mediation is not enough.
Increased use of mediation in many cases currently processed through the
adversary system will develop only if substantial numbers of lawyers begin to
function explicitly as mediators. Our society and most individuals in it are
oriented toward individual rights and interests8 6 and consider-correctly, for
the most part-that lawyers are their only source of help in achieving, perfect-
ing, or protecting such rights. Accordingly, most people involved in disputes
that currently are handled through the adversary process will, even if they are
interested in non-adversarial processing, probably continue to consult law-
yers intially. Knowledge of their legal position often will be vital to the deci-
sion whether to use mediation. Thus, for most people, lawyers will remain the
initial consultants in dispute processing, and for most of these clients, the
lawyers will take a significant degree of control over how the dispute is
handled.
Plainly, many lawyers who do not mediate, if adequately informed about
mediation, would be inclined to make appropriate referrals, especially if they
could retain some control over the strictly legal work. But there also are
strong currents pushing against such referrals. Professionals tend to do what
they know how to do, and they suppose that what they do is to their client's
advantage. Most lawyers (and clients) "assume that if two people can't come
to an agreement, the next stage is for [them] to enter into negotiations
with their lawyer."8" Even the lawyer who does recognize the suitability of
mediation-consciously or unconsciously-would be subject to powerful
forces that would press against referral of the case, or any part of it, to
mediation. First, if the mediator is not a lawyer, there are possible profes-
sional responsibility problems,m as well as the strong feeling that certain kinds
of disputes should be handled only by lawyers and that a lay mediator could
not adequately facilitate decisions on a variety of technical issues.89 Second,
the fear exists that even the suggestion of such referral would destroy the
client's trust by shattering his expectations that the lawyer would serve as his
eager champion. Third, referral to mediation would cost the lawyer all or part
of his fees. And even if he referred only part of the matter-say the custody
decision in a divorce case-he would lose a significant element of control.
85. See Fuller, supra note 37, at 315.
86. See note 6 supra and note It1 infra and accompanying text.
87. Friedman, Mediation: A Good Way to Resolve Some Cases Some of the Time, 11 CAL. TRIAL LAW. J.
117, 117 (1981).
88. See text accompanying notes 67-81 supra.
89. See Rich, The Role of Lawyers: Beyond Advocacy, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 767, 775.
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For similar reasons, the lawyer who did not mediate would not be in-
clined to engage in preventive lawyering approaches that would move his
client toward mediated solutions to disputes that might arise in the future-
such as inserting a clause in a commercial agreement to provide that disputes
under it would be mediated.
But if a cadre of lawyers who were willing and able to serve as mediators
were to develop, clients and cases that were suitable for mediation would
have a better chance of getting access to mediation. Some cases would be
mediated because the disputants would choose a lawyer-mediator, others
because the clients chanced upon a lawyer who mediated. Still others would
be referred to mediation by lawyers who felt confident in the combination of
legal and mediative skills possessed by the law-trained mediator and knew
they could retain something like their traditional lawyer's role.
II. HEADWINDS: PRESSURES AGAINST LAWYERS' PROPER
INVOLVEMENT IN MEDIATION
Most lawyers neither understand nor perform mediation nor have a
strong interest in doing either. At least three interrelated reasons account for
this: the way most lawyers, as lawyers, look at the world; the economics and
structure of contemporary law practice; and the lack of training in mediation
for lawyers.
A. The Lawyer's Standard Philosophical Map
E. F. Schumacher begins his Guide for the Perplexed with the following
story:
On a visit to Leningrad some years ago, I consulted a map ... but I could not
make it out. From where I stood, I could see several enormous churches, yet there
was no trace of them on my map. When finally an interpreter came to help me, he
said: "We don't show churches on our maps." Contradicting him, I pointed to one
that was very clearly marked. "That is a museum," he said, "not what we call a
'living church.' It is only the 'living churches' we don't show."
It then occurred to me that this was not the first time I had been given a map
which failed to show many things I could see right in front of my eyes. All through
school and university I had been given maps of life and knowledge on which there
was hardly a trace of many of the things that I most cared about and that seemed to
me to be of the greatest possible importance to the conduct of my life."'
The philosophical map employed by most practicing lawyers and law
teachers, and displayed to the law student-which I will call the lawyer's
standard philosophical map-differs radically from that which a mediator
must use. 9' What appears on this map is determined largely by the power of
90. E. SCHUMACHER, A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED 1 (1977). For a sociology of knowledge perspective
on why we notice what we notice, see P. BERGER & T. LUCIMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
REALITY (1966).
91. The extreme version of the map that I paint here also is inadequate for a good lawyer. See text
accompanying notes 105-6 infra.
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two assumptions about matters that lawyers handle: (1) that disputants are
adversaries-i.e., if one wins, the others must lose92-and (2) that disputes
may be resolved through application, by a third party, of some general rule of
law. 93 These assumptions, plainly, are polar opposites of those which underlie
mediation: (1) that all parties can benefit through a creative solution to which
each agrees; 94 and (2) that the situation is unique and therefore not to be
governed by any general principle except to the extent that the parties accept
it.
9 5
The two assumptions of the lawyer's philosophical map (adversariness of
parties and rule-solubility of dispute), along with the real demands of the
adversary system and the expectations of many clients, tend to exclude
mediation from most lawyers' repertoires. They also blind lawyers to other
kinds of information that are essential for a mediator to see, primarily by
riveting the lawyers' attention upon things that they must see in order to carry
out their functions. The mediator must, for instance, be aware of the many
interconnections between and among disputants and others, and of the
qualities of these connections; he must be sensitive to emotional needs of all
parties and recognize the importance of yearnings for mutual respect, equal-
ity, security, and other such non-material interests as may be present.9
On the lawyer's standard philosophical map, however, the client's situa-
tion is seen atomistically; many links are not printed. The duty to represent
the client zealously within the bounds of the law discourages concern with
both the opponents' situation and the overall social effect of a given result.97
Moreover, on the lawyer's standard philosophical map, quantities are
bright and large while qualities appear dimly or not at all.98 When one party
wins, in this vision, usually the other party loses, and, most often, the victory
is reduced to a money judgment. This "reduction" of nonmaterial values-
such as honor, respect, dignity, security, and love-to amounts of money, can
have one of two effects. In some cases, these values are excluded from the
decision makers' considerations, and thus from the consciousness of the
92. See Fuller, supra note 37, at 316.
93. See S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS 151-52, 156 (1974). See generally J. SHKLAR,
LEGALISM (1964).
94. See notes 40 and 44, and accompanying text supra.
95. Mediations do typically operate under general assumptions such as fairness, mutuality of obligation,
and cooperation. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
96. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
97. See M. KELLY, LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL EDUCATION 40-41 (1980); S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note
93, at 153, 165.
98. Huston Smith contrasts the modern, secular, and scientific view with the traditional, humanistic and
religious. "The gist of their differences is that modernity, spawned essentially by modern science, stresses
quantity (in order to get at power and control) whereas tradition stresses quality (and the participation that is
control's alternative)." Smith, Excluded Knowledge: A Critique of the Modern Western Mind Set, 80
TEACHERS COLLEGE RECORD 419, 421-22 (1979). Thus, the modern vision leaves out "most of the things that
mankind has considered important throughout its history," including "intrinsic and normative values";
"purposes"; "global and existential meanings"; and "quality." Id. at 423-24.
The modern view clearly helps the lawyer gain and exercise power and control, and it excludes much that is
important, especially for a mediator.
[Vol. 43:29
MEDIATION AND LAWYERS
lawyers, as irrelevant. In others, they are present but transmuted into some-
thing else-a justification for money damages. Much like the church that was
allowed to appear on the map of Leningrad only because it was a museum,
these interests-which may in fact be the principal motivations for a lawsuit-
are recognizable in the legal dispute primarily to the extent that they have
monetary value or fit into a clause of a rule governing liability.
The rule orientation also determines what appears on the map. The law-
yer's standard world view is based upon a cognitive and rational outlook.99
Lawyers are trained to put people and events into categories that are legally
meaningful, to think in terms of rights and duties established by rules,' ° to
focus on acts more than persons. This view requires a strong development of
cognitive capabilities, which is often attended by the under-cultivation of
emotional faculties. 0' This combination of capacities joins with the practice
of either reducing most nonmaterial values to amounts of money or sweeping
them under the carpet, to restrict many lawyers' abilities to recognize the
value of mediation' 02 or to serve as mediators.
The lawyer's standard philosophical map is useful primarily where the
assumptions upon which it is based-adversariness and amenability to solu-
tion by a general rule imposed by a third party-are valid. But when media-
tion is appropriate, these assumptions do not fit. The problem is that many
lawyers, because of their philosophical maps, tend to suppose that these
assumptions are germane in nearly any situation that they confront as law-
yers. The map, and the litigation paradigm on which it is based, has a power
all out of proportion to its utility. Many lawyers, therefore, tend not to recog-
nize mediation as a viable means of reaching a solution; and worse, they see
the kinds of unique solutions that mediation can produce as threatening to the
best interests of their clients.
"One of the central difficulties of our legal system," says John Ayer, "is
its capacity to be deaf to the counsel of ordinary good sense." 0 3 A law school
99. See Redmount. The Transactional Emphasis in Legal Education, 26 J. LEGAL ED. 253,255 (1974); M.
KELLY, supra note 97, at 46.
100. S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 93, at 159.
101. See Redmount, supra note 99, at 256, 258-59; Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, 1
YALE REV. L. & SOC. ACTION 71 (Spring 1970); Savoy, Toward a New Politics of Legal Education, 79 YALE
L.J. 444, 444 n.4 (1970). But cf. Stone, Legal Education on the Couch, 85 HARV. L. REV. 392, 422-23 (1971)
(criticizing Kennedy and Savoy for supposing that the process of separating thought from feeling is unique to
legal education).
For a discussion of several studies that suggest empathy declines during graduate training in psychology,
see I D. HOGAN, THE REGULATION OF PSYCHOTHERAPISTS 146 (1979).
102. Scheingold has argued that the narrow, legalistic world view embraced by activist lawyers makes them
likely to think of their capacity for public service entirely in terms of legal skills. Their skills are, at
once, a source of expertise and the boundary line of legitimate professional behavior....
... Most simply put, lawyers are led to think of their services as a product which is sold rather
than a vital public necessity. Attention is focused on those services that pay rather than on the societal
job that has to be done.
S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 93, at 166-67 (emphasis added).
103. Ayer, Isn't There Enough Reality To Go Around? An Essay On The Unspoken Promises of Our Law,
53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 475, 489-90 (1978).
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classroom incident shows how quickly this deafness afflicts students-usually
without anyones noticing. Professor Kenney Hegland writes:
In my first year Contracts class, I wished to review various doctrines we had
recently studied. I put the following:
In a long term installment contract, Seller promises Buyer to deliver widgets at
the rate of 1000 a month. The first two deliveries are perfect. However, in the third
month Seller delivers only 999 widgets. Buyer becomes so incensed with this that
he rejects the delivery, cancels the remaining deliveries and refuses to pay for the
widgets already delivered. After stating the problem, I asked "If you were Seller,
what would you say?" What I was looking for was a discussion of the various
common law theories which would force the buyer to pay for the widgets delivered
and those which would throw buyer into breach for cancelling the remaining
deliveries. In short, I wanted the class to come up with the legal doctrines which
would allow Seller to crush Buyer.
After asking the question, I looked around the room for a volunteer. As is so
often the case with the first year students, I found that they were all either writing
in their notebooks or inspecting their shoes. There was, however, one eager face,
that of an eight year old son of one of my students. It seems that he was suffering
through Contracts due to his mother's sin of failing to find a sitter. Suddenly he
raised his hand. Such behavior, even from an eight year old, must be rewarded.
"OK," I said, "What would you say if you were the seller?"
"I'd say 'I'm sorry'." 104
I do not mean to imply that all lawyers see only what is displayed on the
lawyer's standard philosophical map. The chart I have drawn exaggerates
certain tendencies in the way many lawyers think. Any good lawyer will be
alert to a range of nonmaterial values, emotional considerations, and inter-
connections.0 5 Many lawyers have "empathic, conciliatory" personalities
that may incline them to work often in a mediative way.'06 And other lawyers,
though they may be more competitive, would recognize the value of media-
tion to their clients. I do submit, however, that most lawyers, most of the
time, use this chart to navigate.
104. Hegland, Why Teach Trial Advocacy? An Essay on Never Ask Why, in HUMANISTIC EDUCATION
IN LAW, Monograph III, at 68-69 (1982).
A similar event brightened an early session of my first year torts class when we were discussing Garratt v.
Dailey, 46 Wash. 2d 197, 297 P.2d 1091 (1955), in which a woman brought a battery action against a 5 year old
boy who allegedly had pulled a chair out from under her as she was sitting down. After it became clear that the
child's parents would not be liable, we discussed why-in a case such as this one-an adult would bring an
action against a child (unless, of course, the child had assets). It became clear that Mrs. Garratt probably wanted
something other than money. I asked whether there would have been some way for the defendant's lawyer to
have disposed of the case quickly. Several students suggested an out-of-court settlement or a written agreement
about keeping young Brian Dailey away from Naomi Garratt. Then I asked what kind of advice they would have
given the Dailey family as a friend, before they had gone to law school. Instantly, someone suggested an
apology.
105. See M. KELLY, supra note 97, at 46. Typically, the lawyer's range of awareness is much narrower
than that required of a mediator; so also is the range of possible solutions that most lawyers will recognize as
valid. See S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 93, at 153.
106. Psychologist-lawyer Robert Redmount has described three types of personalities among lawyers.
Redmount, Attorney Personalities and Some Psychological Aspects of Legal Consultation, 109 U. PA. L. REv.
972, 974 (1961). Two types, the "zealous, aggressive" and "coping, competitive"lawyers, id. at 974-75, 977-78,
probably would view reality more-or-less as shown on the lawyer's standard philosophical map. They would not
lean toward mediation. Lawyers in the third category are "empathic, conciliatory" and would have a more
inclusive perspective that would incline them toward mediative activities. Id. at 976-77.
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One reason for the dominance of this map is that it may be congruent with
the personalities of most lawyers, who may be drawn to the law because of
this map and the ability to control that it gives them.'07 There are other
reasons, though, for its strength, and some of these impress the map's con-
tours on the minds of even the most conciliatory attorneys. First, it is consis-
tent with the expectations of most clients. '" Second, it is very often function-
ally effective in achieving the kinds of results generally expected from a
"victory" in the adversary system. Third, it generally redounds to the
economic benefit of lawyers, and often of clients.'9 Fourth, it gives the ap-
pearance of clarifying the law and making it predictable."0 Fifth, it accords
with widely-shared assumptions that we will achieve the best society by giv-
ing individual self-interest full expression."'
107. In his study of German lawyers, Walter Weyrauch wrote:
It is perhaps not impossible that legal education and legal processes provide attraction and an
outlet to a specific kind of personality. Preoccupation with rules or rituals, intellectualization of
disturbing human problems, and seemingly detached and "cold" rationalizations are factors known to
the psychiatrist from his contact with patients and familiar to anyone who has dealt with lawyers and
law students. A profile of lawyers seems to emerge, some kind of a collective portrait of the styles in
which lawyers think, speak, and act. They tend to be defensive toward such disciplines as sociology
and psychology. They frequently adhere to a philosophy of individualism, denying that their actions
could be governed by behavior patterns. They emphasize legal skills and professional responsibilities.
Prestige and status are very important to them. They think in terms of respect and power hierarchies,
and this may reflect in their involvement in questions of propriety, etiquette, procedure, jurisdiction,
and reciprocal recognition.
In summary, lawyers as a group, contrary to common beliefs and formal resolutions, may have
personality traits that counteract or retard a wide distribution of democratic values among all persons.
Without being fully conscious of the social function of their behavior, they may participate in power
plays and rationalize their decisions in terms of seemingly objective standards. In fact these standards
may cover up unconscious predispositions and identifications, which frequently favor the status quo
and established power alignments.
W. WEYRAUCH, THE PERSONALITY OF LAWYERS 278-79 (1964).
108. M. FRANKEL. supra note 41, at 63-64; May, supra note 6, at 51. William May writes:
Structurally the professional's relationship to the client resembles the relationship of the Lockean
state to the citizen. Both the state and the professional owe their original authority to the threat of a
negative. Both the citizen and the client are relatively passive beneficiaries of powers exercised by
others. Both the citizen and the client are largely active at only two moments, the points of entry and
exit, i.e., when ties are established and when they are dissolved.
Id. There are other similarities as well: "the orientation of the relationship to negative liberty; the satisfaction of
wants, rather than the pursuit of ideals; and the encouragement ofa transactional rather than a transformational
understanding of the professional exchange." Id.
109. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 41, at 64.
110. See S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 93, at 159.
1i. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 41, at 10. This adversary perspective is fixed deeply in the American
consciousness and draws heavily on the thinking of Adam Smith, Locke and Hobbes. See id.; May, supra note
6, at 50-51. As William May writes of our political vision:
[F]irst, it postulates an original condition of humankind characterized by individual autonomy. Second,
it orients any subsequent society to the satisfaction of interests and wants rather than moral ideas.
Third, it traces the origin of the state to supreme evil rather than supreme good. Fourth, it encourages a
passive, rather than an active, notion of citizenship. And fifth, it holds to a transactional, rather than a
transformational, understanding of leadership.
•.. [T]he ideal state of affairs is one in which people are free to act according to their own wants
and interests rather than required to act according to moral ideals, either those of others or those
espoused by organized society. The very concept of social contract implies that the foundation stone
for civil society is self-interest.
Id. at 47-48.
For a more general discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of the lawyer's standard philosophical map,
see text accompanying notes 185-92 infra.
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A final, and dominant, source of the popularity of the standard map is
legal education, which is thoroughly pervaded by this vision. Nearly all
courses at most law schools are presented from the viewpoint of the practic-
ing attorney who is working in an adversary system of act-oriented rules, a
context that he accepts." 2 There is, to be sure, scattered attention to the
lawyer as planner, " 3 policy maker, " 4 and public servant,' 5 but ninety percent
of what goes on in law school is based upon a model of a lawyer working in or
against a background of litigation of disputes that can be resolved by the
application of a rule by a third party." 6 The teachers were trained with this
model in mind. The students bring a rough image with them; it gets sharpened
quickly. This model defines and limits the likely career possibilities en-
visioned by most law students.
The adversary, rule/act perspective infuses not just the subject matter
but also the educational process. Combined with the case method of instruc-
tion, it has a constricting effect. As David Smith has written:
In some respects, the case method contains within it the same infirmities
inherent in the adversary process. In the same way that the adversary process
shapes, determines and excludes evidence on the basis of whether it is 'relevant'
to the hearing, the case reveals only those facts that shed light on the principle of
law being exposed. And just as the adversary process excludes evidence which
might be critical in exposing the more significant social problem underlying the
particular symptomatic problem before the court, so the case typically excludes
evidence of social problems that go beyond the narrow issue with which the case is
concerned. 117
This distinctive point of view colors many interpersonal relationships, too.
The student must compete not just with his professors but with his classmates
as well. Law schools have institutionalized the battle of wits."
18
B. Economic and Structural Considerations
Many lawyers, if they thought about it, would see mediation as an
economic threat. 19 To begin, mediation can remove some cases entirely from
the hands of lawyers. When the parties want legal advice, however, combin-
ing this advice with mediation services offers advantages to certain kinds of
disputants in certain kinds of cases. 20 At the same time, many lawyers who
112. See Goldstein, The Unfulfilled Promise of Legal Education, in LAW IN A CHANGING AMERICA 157,
161 (G. Hazard ed. 1968); S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 93, at 156-58.
113. See L. BROWN & E. DAUER, PLANNING BY LAWYERS (1978).
114. See Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public
Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203 (1943).
115. See Reich, Toward the Humanistic Study of Law, 74 YALE L.J. 1402 (1965).
116. See S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 93, at 159.
117. Smith, supra note 12, at 215.
118. For a discussion of the law school socialization process, see Hannan, Knocking Which Corners Off.
The Study of Law as a Mechanism of Social Integration, 8 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REv. 379 (1977).
119. For a view that it is not such a threat, see text accompanying notes 140-44 infra.
120. See text accompanying notes 16-41 supra.
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normally handle such cases might fear the financial impact of using mediation
or providing it themselves.
Legal fees are generally based upon a portion of the amount recovered or
on an hourly rate. Mediation threatens to reduce the amount recovered, be-
cause in settling their dispute, the parties may wish to include nonmaterial
considerations: for instance, to trade money for respect or recognition. The
lawyer who is paid by the hour-to the extent he is motivated by fees-also
may view mediation dimly. Whether the mediation is performed by the lawyer
himself or another mediator, it is likely to save some of the lawyer's time.
Thus, the lawyer who brings mediation into a case that he could handle in an
adversary manner will often earn less than he otherwise would have on that
case.
He may also earn less in the future from the clients involved in that case.
Through mediation, the parties may have learned to manage their relation-
ships in such a way as to lessen their future dependence upon lawyers .'2
Even if the clients have the need, if the lawyer serves as mediator himself, he
will be barred from representing any of them in matters connected with the
mediation. 122 He may fear, in addition, that they would not want to employ
him as an adversary lawyer, even in unrelated matters, because they no
longer think of him as their valiant champion.
To the extent that a lawyer begins to function explicitly as a mediator, he
loses some of the power connected with the distinctiveness of his functions.
This may weaken the client's perceived need for a lawyer or his wish to retain
this one. It also may jar the lawyer's own sense of professional integrity and
role identification. 123
C. Absence of Mediation Education For Lawyers
The third reason that few lawyers understand mediation or wish to be
connected with it in their work is that they have never been educated about
mediation or trained in mediation skills. Until quite recently they had almost
no opportunity to do so. Today the situation is somewhat improved. Although
only a few law schools provide any exposure to mediation outside the labor
relations context, 24 some neighborhood justice centers and court- or com-
121. This should be an important goal of mediation. See Fuller, supra note 37, at 325-26.
122. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-20 (1980) provides:
A lawyer is often asked to serve as an impartial arbitrator or mediator in matters which involve present
or former clients. He may serve in either capacity if he first discloses such present or former relation-
ships. After a lawyer has undertaken to act as an impartial arbitrator or mediator, he should not
thereafter represent in the dispute any of the parties involved.
See also id. DR 5-105.
123. See Friedman, supra note 45, at 42; Stone, supra note 101, at 402.
124. On April 17, 198 1, 1 sent letters to the deans of all ABA approved law schools and recognized Canadian
law schools requesting, among other things, [a]n indication ofwhether your law school offers a course orseminar
on alternative (especially non-adversarial) methods of dispute resolution such as mediation, and, if so, the name of
the responsible faculty member."
Over 70% (131 out of 181) of the schools responded. Ten mentioned a course or seminar that dealt with
mediation. At Boston College, "some mediation is taught" in a Criminal Process clinical program. Letter from
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munity-based mediation programs offer training to lawyers and nonlawyers
alike, as does the Family Mediation Association in the five-day programs that
it presents around the country.'25 And the Center for the Development of
Mediation in Law puts on workshops designed primarily for lawyers. 26 Each
of these opportunities is relatively new, and each requires a good deal of
initiative on the part of the lawyer. Together, they have touched only a
miniscule proportion of the bar; but they may well mark the beginnings of a
significant development in the education of lawyers.
Mediation education for many more lawyers is required if our society is
to make optimum use of mediation. I am speaking not only of education about
mediation; I mean to include skills training provided experientially. The
unique satisfactions and frustrations of mediation; the personal and profes-
sional conflicts it raises; the tendencies inherent in both the legal and the
mediational perspectives toward undermining the salutory contributions of
the other; the willingness and ability of an individual lawyer to mediate or help
determine whether a given case is suitable for mediation-each of these can
be grasped better if the intellectual content is suspended in the gel of expe-
rience, even if that means running a mock mediation.
A lawyer's openness to mediation and his ability to mediate will be
directly and intricately related to the compound of his personality and his
stage in life and in practice. '27 Some, with sensitive and conciliatory personal-
ities, would be interested in mediation-if they had a chance to know about
it-as early as law school. Others would be far too concerned with the real
Dean Richard Huber (April 27, 1981). Students at Capital University serve as mediators in a Night Prosecutor's
Program. Letter from Director of Admissions C. Ricksecker (May 26, 1981). At Case Western Reserve, media-
tion is included in a required first year course called Conflicts Resolution. Letter from Associate Dean H. Ross
(undated). A Seminar on the Negotiation and Mediation of Domestic Disputes is taught by Professor Susan
Lewis at Duke. Letter from Duke University School of Law (undated). Professor Alan Widiss teaches a
negotiation and mediation class at the University of Iowa. Letter from Assistant to the Dean A. Scieszinki (April
20, 1981). A course on alternative methods of dispute resolution is offered by Professor Richard Berg at Santa
Clara. Letter from Dean George Alexander (April 23, 1981). Mediation is included as part of a Small Claims
Court Evening Clinical Program at Southwestern, coordinated by Professor Georgia Torres Rizk. Course
Description, Summer Session 1981, Small Claims Clinical Program, Southwestern University School of Law.
Professors Richard Ellison and Robert Rabin at Syracuse offer a course on Conflict Resolution. Letter from
Assistant to the Dean R. Ingles (May 18, 1981). Professor Paul H. Sanders teaches a seminar on Conflict
Resolution and the Legal Process at Vanderbilt. Letter from Administrative Assistant to the Dean P. Ogle (May
19, 1981). The University of Western Ontario offers a course on Dispute Settlement, which is taught by
Professor E. E. Palmer. Letter from Assistant Dean D. McNair (May 22, 1981).
I am aware of a few other offerings. At Harvard, a course on mediation is given by Professor Frank
Sander. Letter from Prof. Frank A. E. Sander (Dec. 9, 1981). Gary Friedman teaches a course in mediation at
the New College Law School in San Francisco. Interview with Gary Friedman, June 22, 1981. I teach mediation
as parts of courses on Legal Interviewing and Counseling and Family Law, and I plan to offera separate course
on mediation in the near future.
125. Training Programs, FAM. MEDIATOR, Nov. 1981, at 4. The Academy of Family Mediators, formed in
late 1981 by members of the Executive Board of the Family Mediation Association. Letter from Academy of
Family Mediators Organizing Committee (undated), is beginning to offer mediation training programs across the
country. The Academy of Family Mediators, Divorce Mediation: A Five Day Introductory Training Program
(Feb. 11-15, 1982).
126. Center for the Development of Mediation in Law, The Practice of Mediation, A Workshop for
Lawyers and Other Professionals (August 19-23, 1981).
127. Redmount, supra note 106, at 980-82.
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difficulties of learning to be a lawyer and. finding a job. Their interest would
develop, if at all, only after practice brings them to despair about some
aspects of the adversarial orientation. But even these people, if exposed to
mediation in law school, could begin to enrich their philosophical maps and
their ideas of what "a lawyer" can properly do. A large block of lawyers who
already practice in a "mediational" way within the confines of their adver-
sarial role might be lured into a heavier involvement with mediation per se if
somehow they became familiar with mediation in a context that was congenial
to their lives as lawyers. Finally, I suspect that a large part of the bar-
because of its reliance upon the lawyer's standard philosophical map and the
instrumental value of that map-would never become enthusiastic about or
even interested in mediation.
Because of this variability in lawyers' openness to mediation and the
impact that mediation education can have on an individual lawyer's world
view, 21 such education must be available to both law students and graduates.
This means that mediation should be part of the law school curriculum and of
continuing education programs, which typically are sponsored or controlled
by the bar.
The pervasiveness of the standard lawyer's philosophical map and the
assumption that increased use of mediation is an economic threat to the
profession will impede the development of high quality mediation education
for lawyers. Moreover, just as doing mediation may threaten a lawyer's sense
of professional integrity and distinctiveness,' 29 teaching mediation to lawyers
may threaten the integrity and distinctiveness of the bar or law schools.
Additionally, both of these institutions tend to follow rather than lead their
constituents, to deal with what is, rather than what should be.
Yet it seems almost certain that the bar and law schools will increasingly
support some kinds of education about mediation. My fear is that innovation
will be constrained by a notion that mediation is simply another nonjudicial
method of resolving minor disputes, to be judged mainly by its ability to
reduce court congestion and process cases that traditionally have not pro-
duced significant fees for lawyers. 30 From this perspective, which could ig-
nore mediation's potential for fostering or suppressing justice,1'' not much
depth is required in lawyers' mediation education.
III. TAILWINDS: FORCES FOR LAWYERS' PROPER
INVOLVEMENT IN MEDIATION
In my description above of the forces pushing against proper involvement
of lawyers in mediation, I concentrated upon conservative perspectives. The
128. See text accompanying note 184 infra.
129. See text accompanying note 123 supra.
130. The title of a panel discussion at a recent ABA annual meeting is some inspiration for this fear. ABA,
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Bane or Boon to Attorneys? (New Orleans, August 11, 1981).
131. See Hofrichter, supra note 20, at 168.
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resistance to mediation in law firms, bar associations, and law schools that is
based upon economic and structural considerations stems from a "bureau-
cratic" mentality, that is, one geared toward maintaining or increasing the
power or wealth of the legal profession. Similarly, the lawyer's standard
philosophical map is concerned more with the "is" than with the "ought" of
law. I wish to make clear, however, that these perspectives can support, as
well as retard, increased involvement in mediation by lawyers. In addition,
there are "higher" points of viewing that can move the legal profession in
this direction.32
A. Conservative Forces
Consumer demand for mediation services is likely to increase. This
development will be fueled in part by a desire to avoid the harshness and
high cost of adversary processing, the same wish that inspired no-fault
systems for automobile accident compensation 3  and divorce'3 and the
growth of comparative negligence. 135 The demand for mediation also will be
enhanced by forces associated with the self-help 36 and "Small is Beautiful"
movements. 137
Plainly, there will be conservative forces impelling lawyers, bar associa-
tions, and law schools to become involved in this growth activity. At base
there is the matter of protecting turf. In the bureaucratic perspective, as
demand grows for mediation of matters currently handled by adversary pro-
cesses, the bar as a whole may perceive that it is losing power, control, or
money unless it gets involved.138 Moreover, the disputants' needs for legal
advice may be seen as so great as to compel the profession to step forward to
protect them. 1
39
132. Phillipe Nonet and Phillip Selznick describe three developmental stages of law-repressive, autono-
mous, and responsive-that can exist simultaneously within various segments of the same legal order. P.
NONET'& P. SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW (1978). Repressive
law serves the interests of the elite. Its main function is to keep order, and under it, officials have almost
unbridled discretion. Id. at 40-41. Autonomous law has as its principal end the legitimation and maintenance of
the existing system. It is characterized by procedure and legalism. Id. at 54. Responsive law is dominated by a
strong sense of purpose-serving the needs of individuals and society. Id. at 73-74. Therefore, it is less legalistic
than autonomous law and "brings a promise of civility to the way law is used to define and maintain public
order." Id. at 90. It is characterized by competence. Id. at 98. These types of law correspond to what other
scholars have identified as stages in the development of organizations: pre-bureaucratic, bureaucratic, and
post-bureaucratic. Id. at 99-100.
I have already suggested that mediation could be used to bolster a repressive regime. See text accompany-
ing notes 51-52 supra. In this Part, I seek to demonstrate that forces which could support greater involvement in
mediation by lawyers are found in both middle and higher stages of bureaucracy and law.
133. See J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW, NO-FAULT AND BEYOND 33 (abr. ed. 1976).
134. See C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW 1102 (2d ed.
1976).
135. See V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 31 (1974).
136. See Mediation-Dispute Resolution Programs, in PEOPLES' LAW REVIEW 201 (R. Warner ed. 1980).
137. Smith, supra note 12, at 209. See text accompanying notes 176-80 infra.
138. See note 130 and text accompanying notes 119-23 supra.
139. The danger is that lawyers acting from these two motives are likely to over-legalize the mediation
process, sapping the strength associated with its flexibility.
[Vol. 43:29
MEDIATION AND LAWYERS
The increased demand for mediation services can affect the practicing
lawyer in several ways. Disputants who initially seek mediation, rather than
legal services, will need legal advice during and after the mediation.
Mediators will tend to refer such work to lawyers who understand and are not
unnecessarily disruptive of the process. Sometimes the initial contact by
parties seeking mediation will be with a lawyer. Should the disputants and the
matter seem suitable for mediation, there are several professionally advanta-
geous ways that the lawyer can provide such services.,4o
Thus, as more people come to understand mediation, there will be in-
creasing monetary rewards for individual lawyers who can mediate or advise
clients who are mediating. The heightened call for legal services connected
with mediation will create a demand from lawyers and law students for in-
struction in mediation. Both the bar and law schools are inclined toward
providing training of the sort that their constituents (lawyers and law
students) want-unless there are countervailing considerations. Aside from
the lawyer's standard philosophical map,' 41 the most significant obstacle to
the provision of some kind of mediation education by law schools and the bar
is the perception that the increased use of mediation may be detrimental to the
income of lawyers. 142 Though this perception may be accurate as applied to
many lawyers, there is one line of thought that may make mediation appealing
even to those who are principally concerned about protecting the financial
security of the bar.
It is true that mediation typically will cost the clients much less than
adversary processing. 43 The lawyer who converts an adversarial case into a
mediation may, therefore, take a great fee reduction on that case."
Mediation, however, is not necessarily a money loser for either individual
lawyers, firms, or the bar as a whole. Many lawyers and firms have more
work than they can handle and are in the habit of turning away cases when
they feel too busy. They would not lose fees by converting an adversary case
into a mediation nor by advising a client who is in mediation, since they can
apply the time saved to other fee-generating matters. In addition, some
lawyer-mediators' practices may develop so that virtually all of their billable
time is spent on mediations.
It is possible that some lawyer is losing a fee every time a mediation takes
place. But it does not follow that as mediation-cum-legal advice becomes
more common the total number of hours billed by lawyers will decline and,
therefore, that the bar as a whole will lose money. As mediation, properly
combined with legal advice, becomes widely available, lawyers will be able to
140. See text accompanying notes 58-83 supra.
141. See text accompanying notes 90-118 supra.
142. See text accompanying notes 119-23 supra.
143. Friedman, Mediation: Reducing Dependence on Lawyers and Courts to Achieve Justice, in PEOPLES'
LAW REVIEW 42, 46 (R. Warner ed. 1980). See Bahr, supra note 33, at 32.
144. See text accompanying notes 119-20 supra.
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help many people who currently cannot afford legal services, thus swelling
the ranks of paying consumers.
B. Progressive Forces
Though the preceding argument may not dispel worries about lawyers'
financial security, "higher" perspectives in jurisprudence, in the orientations
of individual lawyers and the bar, and in the goals of legal education can pull
the legal profession toward appropriate and deeper involvement with media-
tion.
There are streams in modem legal philosophy strong enough to carry
mediation into prominence on the lawyer's map. A few examples: Both
sociological jurisprudence and some branches of American legal realism were
aimed at making law responsive to society's needs, in part by expanding the
notion of what-beyond its rules-is relevant to law.' 45 The jurisprudence of
Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell similarly downplayed the importance
of authoritative rules in favor of marshalling all available knowledge with a
goal of advancing human dignity.' 46A strong sense of purpose is present also
in the work of Lon Fuller, 47 who was also concerned with the quality of the
order created by the legal system.4 8He urged a focusing of attention on the
various forms of social ordering, including mediation. 149 In addition, he ar-
gued that more attention should be paid to the "customary law" that develops
from the interaction among people, 50 and, indeed, that an important emphasis
of law should be to facilitate such interaction, 5' which, of course, is exactly
what mediation does.
The role of intermediary has a long history in the legal profession. 5 2 That
role can provide much satisfaction to lawyers. Mahatma Gandhi relates that
after he persuaded his victorious client to agree to accept installment pay-
ments instead of a lump sum, which the defendant would have been unable to
deliver,
[b]oth were happy over the result, and both rose in the public estimation. My joy
was boundless. I had learnt the true practice of the law. I had learnt to find out the
better side of human nature and to enter men's hearts. I realizedcthat the true
function of a lawyer was to unite parties riven asunder. 153
145. P. NONET & P. SELZNICK, supra note 132, at 73-76.
146. Lasswell and McDougal, Criteria ForA Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 362, 365-68 (1971).
147. Summers, Professor Fuller's Jurisprudence and America's Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 433 passim (1978).
148. Id. at 436-37.
149. Fuller, supra note 37, at 327; Fuller, Some Unexplored Social Dimensions of the Law, in THE PATH
OF LAW FROM 1967, at 57, 60-61 (A. Sutherland ed. 1968); Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
150. Fuller, Law As An Instrument of Social Control and Law as a Facilitation of Human Interaction, 1975
B.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 94.
151. Id. at 95.
152. See Rich, supra note 89, at 777-79.
153. M. GANDHI, AUTOBIOGRAPHY, THE STORY OF MY EXPERIMENTS WITH TUTH 168 (1948).
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These and similar orientations, of course, have influenced the growth of a
public interest perspective in many law firms and in the organized bar, which
has long recognized that the lawyer's responsibilities extend well beyond the
adversary function and include, in addition to direct service to the public,
helping people collaborate.' 4 This perspective favors the development of
mediation training by some such firms and by bar associations.
Certain areas of law have moved sharply away from the strict adversarial
win-lose orientation in response to individual and societal needs. I have
already mentioned the development of no-fault systems of divorce and acci-
dent compensation law and the growth of comparative negligence. 55 The
latest Restatement of Contracts contains several new sections that lend them-
selves to "half measures" of relief. 156 Moreover, in many cases courts
impose or encourage compromise recoveries notwithstanding the formal reign
of a winner-take-all philosophy. '57 The recent popularity of joint custody of
children following divorce is another example. 58 Finally, a number of juris-
dictions now have statutes requiring conciliation attempts for certain kinds of
issues before adversary processing. 5 9
The responsive streams and some of their tributaries have been important
influences in legal education, too. Though dealing with rules is still the pri-
mary learning in law school, the notion of what is relevant has widened in
most classrooms to include political, economic, social, and emotional factors
that do or should impact on decisions and the effects of decisions on indivi-
duals and society. A variety of efforts at heightening awareness of how law or
legal education affects persons involved in these processes have been advo-
cated or launched. These include focused attempts to blend law with be-
havioral science' 60 or humanistic disciplines, 16 1 which have impacted upon
law school curricula in varying degrees, and a growing tendency to include
"nonlegal" materials in casebooks. 62 An emphasis upon nonadversarial per-
154. Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958).
155. See text accompanying notes 133-35 supra.
156. For a discussion of these, see Young, Half Measures, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 19 (1981).
157. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-The Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 NW. U.L.
REV. 750 passim (1964).
For the view that the concern for "swift and certain justice" has contributed to the decline of certain
procedures that are important to the adversary system, see Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary System:
How the Rhetoric of Swift and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American Courts, 29 BUFFALO L.
REV. 487 (1980).
158. See Folberg and Graham, Joint Custody of Children Following Divorce, 12 U.C.D. L. REV. 523
(1979).
159. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4607 (West Supp. 1980); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.081 (West Supp. 1980).
160. See, e.g., J. KATZ, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. DERSHOWrrZ, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW
(1967); L. FRIEDMAN & S. MACAULY, LAW AND THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (1969); R. POSNER, ECO-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972); C. REASONS & R. RICH, THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW: A CONFLICT PERSPEC-
TIVE (1978).
161. See, e.g., E. DVORKIN, H. LESNICK & J. HIMMELSTEIN, BECOMING A LAWYER: A HUMANISTIC
PERSPECTIVE ON LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONALISM (1981); J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS
OF THE LAW (1976); Abramson, Law, Humanities and the Hinterlands, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27 (1979); Smith,
The Coming Renaissance in Law and Literature, 30 J. LEGAL EDUC. 13 (1979).
162. E.g., J. HENDERSON & R. PEARSON, THE TORTS PROCESS (2d ed. 1980); C. FOOTE, R. LEVY & F.
SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAW (2d ed. 1976).
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spectives has emerged in some courses on interviewing and counseling, 6 3
human relations training,' 64 planning,' 65 and negotiations.66 The growth of
clinical legal education provides a window for the exploration of human issues
in lawyering.' 67 In addition, efforts to bring human dimensions into legal
education-such as the Project for the Study and Application of Humanistic
Education in Law, based at Columbia Law School,' 68 and Harvard Law
School's Fellowships in Law and Humanities program' 69-have prospered
alongside the more traditional law and economics programs, which tend to fit
squarely on the lawyer's standard philosophical map.70
Some allegiance to serving the public interest can probably be found in
nearly any law school. While many in the legal and law teaching professions
hold that training people to be competent and conscientious lawyers is itself a
public service-on the assumption that what lawyers do redounds to the
benefit of society '7 1 -leading scholars have advocated a direct commitment
to the public good, 172 and some law schools have explicitly 73 or implicitly' 74
embraced such a goal. The recognition of an obligation to serve the general
welfare, even when it is severely limited, 75 is one strap that can support
further involvement of law schools in mediation training.
These forces pushing toward expansion of appropriate involvement in
mediation by lawyers are likely to be enhanced by developments in our
society. Daniel Yankelovich has argued that American psychoculture has
163. Goodpaster, The Human Arts of Lawyering: Interviewing and Counseling, 27 J. LEGAL EDUC. 5, 6
(1975); see T. SHAFFER & R. REDMOUNT, LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING (1980); T. SHAFFER,
LEGAL INTERVIEWING AND COUNSELING IN A NUTSHELL (1976).
164. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CATALOGUE 79 (1980).
165. See L. BROWN & E. DAUER, supra note 113.
166. See H. EDWARDS & J. WHITE, PROBLEMS, READINGS, AND MATERIALS ON THE LAWYER AS
NEGOTIATOR (1977).
167. See Stone, supra note 101, at 429-30.
168. For information on this program, see Himmelstein, Reassessing Law Schooling:An Inquiry Into The
Application of Humanistic Educational Psychology To The Teaching of Law, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 558-59
(1978); see generally HUMANISTIC EDUCATION IN LAW, Monograph III (1982).
169. See Kirshen, Humanization of Lawyers at Harvard, 61 A.B.A. J. 223 (1975).
170. See Guzzardi, Judges Discover the Wonderful World of Economics, FORTUNE, May 21, 1979, at 58,
66.
171. This seems to be an implicit assumption of the unusually comprehensive study of legal education by
Gee and Jackson. See Gee and Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency, 1977
B.Y.U. L. REV. 695.
172. See Lasswell and McDougal, supra note 114; Reich, supra note 115; Graetz and Whitebread,
Monrad Paulsen and the Idea of a University Law School, 67 VA. L. REV. 445 (1981).
173. UNIVERSITY OF BRIDGEPORT SCHOOL OF LAW 1980-81 (bulletin) at 10 provides: "The primary goal
of this Law School is to provide an excellent professional education in the public interest." The City University
of New York Law School, opening in 1983 in Queens, will have a "special orientation towards public interest
law and public service .... - AALS Newsletter, Mar. 1982, at 7.
174. See, e.g., UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO SCHOOL OF LAW 1979-81 BULLETIN at 12-13; UNIVERSITY
OF VIRGINIA SCHOOL OF LAW RECORD 1980-81, at 7.
175. The Harvard Law School
tries to prepare its graduates to deal with legal problems as they arise wherever the common law
prevails. It seeks to accomplish this purpose by providing comprehensive training for practice of the
legal profession and also by furnishing an enlightened backgroundfor those interested in public service
at the local, state, federal and international levels, in and out of public office and for law teachers and
legal scholars.
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CATALOG at 16 (1980-81) (emphasis supplied).
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passed from an ethic of self-denial to an ethic of self-fulfillment, and now,
because the economic decline makes the self-fulfillment ethic unreasonable
(and because it did not bring self-fulfillment anyway), we are beginning to
move toward an ethic of commitment. 76 The self-fulfillment ethic is compat-
ible with the adversary win-lose orientation because the self is equated with a
group of needs, wants, and desires without reference to the interests of
others.'77 It sees the self in isolation. One result of our competitive and in-
strumental orientation has been the often-noted "dehumanization" of con-
temporary American society.
The new ethic of commitment, on the other hand, springs from a desire in
individuals for a better balance between the material and the "sacred/expres-
sive" aspects of life. 78 It involves necessarily a shift from the self, from a
focus on inner needs, toward a "connectedness with the world," a search for
a sense of community, and "by breaking through the iron cage of rationalism
and instrumentalism," an attempt to "make industrial society a fit place for
human life."' 179 An important part of the new ethic is to take control over
one's own decision making and to defer less to power-elites such as lawyers.'8 0
Yankelovich may be overly facile in identifying holders of the new ethic
or designating them a vanguard.' 8' But to the extent his perceptions are valid,
we can anticipate more people wishing to use mediation instead of adversary
processes. The shift in ethic similarly would incline many lawyers and law
students toward learning about and doing mediation.
IV. DOWNWASH: " (POSSIBLE) BENEFITS OF THE GROWTH OF
MEDIATION EDUCATION FOR LAWYERS
Mediation education for lawyers is essential if our society is to make the
best use of mediation. 83 This best use would save people time and money and
a portion of the emotional turmoil that often accompanies adversary proces-
sing. It would protect the legal rights of the disputants and yield resolutions that
suited their needs. In addition, the development of mediation and mediation
education for lawyers could strengthen the various progressive forces de-
scribed in the preceding section. The spread of mediation could do much to
improve the quality of life in our society, not only because of the savings it
brings, but because it fosters interaction among people and empowers them to
control their own lives.
There are similar benefits-not very certain, but profoundly important-
that could follow merely from the development of mediation education for
176. D. YANKELOVICH, supra note 6, at 250.
177. Id. at 256-57.
178. Id. at 254-55.
179. Id. at 262.
180. Id. at 263.
181. See Wrong, Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 9, 1981, at 28.
182. "Downwash" is a "'downward component of air velocity in the neighborhood of the wing" of a
moving airplane. J. ANDERSON, INTRODUCTION TO FLIGHT 179 (1978).
183. See text accompanying notes 84-89 supra.
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lawyers. The provision of good quality mediation-cum-legal services could
help lawyers, the bar, and the law schools fulfdl the strong impulses-fre-
quently shaded on the lawyer's standard philosophical map-to make law
more responsive to the needs of individuals and society. Properly done,
mediation training can enhance the learner's awareness of his own emotional
needs and value orientations and those of others. It should expand his ability
to understand both sides of a case-not just with his head but with his heart as
well. These sensitivities can, of course, make the lawyer better able to per-
ceive his clients' needs and, on a purely instrumental level, to work more
effectively with all manner of people.
And there is much more to it. Mediation highlights the interconnected-
ness of human beings.'84 Lawyers who notice the interconnectedness are less
vulnerable to the kind of over-enthusiasm with the adversary role that has
brought about much of its sinister reputation. Lawyers who can experience
both sides of a controversy-not merely understand the legal arguments-will
have an awareness of consequences that can become a guide to their conduct
which can compete with the established rules of lawyers' behavior. This may,
when appropriate, blunt the edge of their adversarialness. It may also help
them recognize that although their individual clients may be doing fine, in
many ways the judicial system is not serving most people well.
I do not mean to indict the lawyer's standard philosophical map. In many
cases, lawyers must use it. Most clients and judges expect them to. Moreover,
the adversary-rule perspective from which the standard map is drawn has real
strengths. 85 It promotes a loyalty to clients. It encourages vigorous presentation
of competing positions and interests. The rule orientation fosters in the lawyer
an allegiance to the system of laws, which in turn serves to unify society, to
provide a measure of security of expectations, and to keep open possibilities
of fairness between persons irrespective of status and of vindication of the
rights of the downtrodden. But at the same time, the lawyer's conventional
view of the world permits a great deal of misery. It does this by dominating
the professional consciousness of most lawyers and legal educators too fully,
crowding or crowding out other views.8 6
An enormous percentage of potential consumers of legal services are
either ill-served or not served at all by our legal system.'s7 Many people can
afford a lawyer only when a contingent fee arrangement is feasible. Those
who can get into the litigation process will find it enormously time consuming,
expensive, uncertain, and unpleasant unless their lawyers can arrange settle-
ments.'8 And much of this results directly from the over-zealousness with
which many lawyers routinely embrace their adversarial roles. 189 Many law-
184. See Northrop, supra note 4, at 358-59.
185. See Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (1958).
186. See text accompanying notes 90-118 supra.
187. See generally VERDICTS ON LAWYERS (R. Nader & M. Green eds. 1976).
188. See M. FRANKEL, supra note 41, at 18-19.
189. Id. at 36.
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yers tend to delay and obscure the truth in the service (usually) of their
clients' financial interest.190 Often they "exacerbate and prolong the contest
rather than ... arrive at a quiet compromise. "'9'
That this situation persists can be attributed in no small measure to the
strength of the lawyer's standard philosophical map. The atomistic perspec-
tive, the inclination to accept the adversary system as it is and assume that it
is useful, the focus on legal rights and interests (often reduced to monetary
terms), the assumption of an adversary stance'92---all these tendencies com-
bine to permit the working lawyer to ignore, at least while he is working, the
well-known adverse conditions that I set forth above.
A lawyer who has experienced the mediational perspective would have
difficulty keeping on his adversarial blinders and would be more likely, there-
fore, to acknowledge the serious difficulties in our current adversary system.
The mediation experience also may encourage the lawyer to come up with
creative solutions to systemic as well as individual problems. Mediation train-
ing and practice can help lawyers question the many (often unconscious)
value presuppositions that underlie normal lawyer behavior-for example,
assumptions about adversariness and rules, how lawyers behave, and what
clients want-from which we tend to operate automatically. 93 Mediation
training, in other words, may help lawyers break out of the "mental grooves
and compartments'"' characteristic of the lawyer's conventional world view.
This can lead not just to mediation but to legal services that are more respon-
sive to the needs of clients and of society.
Mediation training offers law schools some special advantages. It could
aid them enormously in dealing with the old issue of teaching professional
responsibility. " Many of the most difficult problems of legal ethics derive
from the adversary perspective that pervades the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. A mediation course could force students to confront and come
to grips with their own relationship to the adversary system. 96 It could help
them examine the suppositions underlying the adversary-rule orientation and
decide when these make sense and when they do not. Many sensitive law
190. Id. at 17.
191. Id. at 114.
192. See text accompanying notes 90-118 supra.
193. Cf. Bohm, On Insight and its Significance, for Science, Education, and Values, 80 TEACHERS
COLLEGE RECORD 403, 414-15 (1979) ("[N]otice what actually happens when we make value judgments. In
effect, these are conclusions concerning what is and what is not of value, and such conclusions are, of course,
imprinted in memory as presuppositions. We then act immediately from this kind of presupposition, generally
with little or no conscious awareness that this is what is actually happening.").
194. Id. at 414. Bohm argues that the development of "insight" should be a focus of education:
iTlhe ordinary state of mind tends to be one of hubris, in which each person is inclined to think that his
basic notions are some kind of final truth. This may well be one of the greatest barriers of all to insight.
Only when such hubris is absent can the mind flow freely in new directions that allow reason to
develop in original ways.
Id. at 408-09.
195. For thoughtful examination of this subject, see M. KELLY, supra note 97.
196. This is an explicit objective of the mediation course taught by Gary Friedman at New College School
of Law in San Francisco. Interview with Gary Friedman (June 23, 1981).
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students are repelled by the strength and pervasiveness of the lawyer's usual
world view and drop-literally or figuratively-out of the competitive atmos-
phere that blankets law school and law practice. Teaching mediation can
demonstrate that there is room for these people in the legal profession and in
law school. It can not only soften the adversary perspective, but present an
alternative role model as well. Thus, mediation training can do for law
students what mediation can do for disputants: help them decide for them-
selves what they want to do with their lives.'97
197. Krishnamurti has argued that an important function of education should be to help students under-
stand themselves, to discover what they most care about. J. KRISHNAMURTI, ON EDUCATION 94 (1974). The
Legal Profession course offered at Harvard Law School by Professors Andrew Kaufman and Michael David
Rosenberg encourages "students to address the questions, what kind of lawyer do I want to be and to what kind
of profession do I wish to belong." HARVARD LAW SCHOOL CATALOGUE 93 (1979-1980). My own less-than-
successful attempt to provide this kind of service to students is recounted in Riskin. On Teaching With Love,
HUMANISTIC EDUCATION IN LAW, Monograph III at 57 (1982).
